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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

by federal survey are navigable and public waters and all persons shall
have the same rights thereon and thereto as in and to all other navigable
or public waters within the state, and the act shall not interfere with
any vested rights theretofore acquired upon such lakes. The law is now
section 30.01 (i).

Whether a given body of water is navigable within

the meaning here attached becomes, in the absence of legislative declaration, a question of fact.
In no other case has the question arisen as to whether the title of
the state to the bed of a navigable lake permits the lawful disposition
of substances found in or under such body of water. Language is found
in several decisions tending to indicate that it was the opinion of the
court that the state's title carried with it no power to grant anything
thereof to others and that such title was so impressed with the public
trust that there was nothing left which resembles any of the incidents
of private ownership so far as the power to dispose of was concerned.' 0
Apparently in England the crown claims the right to mines and
minerals under channels and rivers." In a few cases found in this
country, it has been held a proper exercise such title even though held
under 1trust,
to allow selling or disposing of products therein or there2
under.

-The Court believes that it was within the power of the Legislature
to enact section 31.02 (5) and that no rights of the plaintiffs under
the federal or state Constitutions are invaded by such an act.
Although no mention is made of the rights of riparian owners to such
navigable waters, the presumption is that the Legislature did not intend
to give leave or license to persons acting thereunder to invade or injure
the rights of riparian owners on such navigable waters, or to take
away from such owners or others injured in the carrying on of such
work the usual remedies for wrongs.
GEORGE J. UHLAR
Partnership--Right of Wife to contract as Co-Partner with her
husband.*
Replevin to recover merchandise and store fixtures seized under
a writ of attachment in an action in which the First National Bank
of Crandon was plaintiff and J. F. Sparlks, husband of plaintiff in the
present action, was defendant. Kuss, sheriff, levied the attachment.
Sparks filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and one, Prescott, was
appointed trustee. By stipulation of the parties to prevent deterioration, the goods held by sheriff were sold by the trustee and the funds
kept in his possession. Plaintiff, Nannie Sparks, began this action
against the sheriff and the bank for an alleged amount of $30,000.
Lower court held wife was the owner and entitled to one-half the
proceeds from the sale. Judgment was entered in her favor, from
which she appeals, claiming more money. Notices of review were
filed by the receiver of the bank, subsequently appointed, and by the
trustee in bankruptcy.
'Bixby v. Parish, 148 Wis. 421.
'0 McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427.
'28 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 360, par. 653.
12 Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 380; 12 Sup. Ct. 689; 36. L.
ed. 537.
*Sparks v. Kuss et al. 26o N.W. 929, Wis. Sup. Ct.

NOTES AND COMMENT

This case is interesting because of the rules laid down permitting
the relationship of partners in a bercantile business, between husband
and wife. The comment is confined to these issues.
Sparks and his wife had engaged for years in real estate transactions;
title having been taken jointly. They had carried on a business in the
name of Sparks; one under the partnership name of Sparks and
Fielding, and another, the one under discussion, under the name of
Sparks. Plaintiff managed and ran this business, having an equal
voice in the control thereof. She carried a large share of the responsibility of this business. J. F. Sparks had withdrawn more than
his share of the assets from this business over the protest of his wife
and with the knowledge of the bank, which was a creditor of J. F.
Sparks at the time of the levy on the stock and fixtures. Plaintiff contended the stock was her separate property. Sparks before he filed
his petition in bankruptcy had conveyed his remaining interest in the
business to his wife.
Court held that such transfer was not fraudulent as to the bank
which knew of the relationship between husband and wife, and of the
withdrawals; but as against individual creditors of Sparks, wife was
estopped from asserting her partnership interest in the stock where
insurance policies, checking accounts, contracts, were carried on in the
husband's name, and no partnership income tax reports were ever filed.
As to creditors of the business, wife was a dormant partner and liable
as such. Court also held that the wife, having paid partnership liabilities out of her separate estate was entitled to reimbursement therefor,
and goods paid for out of her sole property for the business were
not subject to a claim of her husband's creditors.
At common law, the relationship of partners between husband and
wife was not permitted by reason of the wife's lack of capacity to
contract.' The reason for this was that in contemplation of law they
were as one person and the wife was so far under the control of the
husband as to be deprived of contractual volition.
Where the married woman's inability to contract with her husband
has been removed by statute, she may enter into a partnership with
her husband.2 Authorization so to do, depends on the nature of the
statute in force at the date of the contract and the construction placed
3
on the statute by the' court.

According to the weight of authority,

statutes conferring general contractual 4 powers on a married woman
enable her to contract with her husband.
Statutes authorizing a married woman to contract as a feme sole
have been construed as giving her capacity to contract with her husband.5 Under code provisions broadly removing all disabilities of
coverture husband and wife may become partnes with each other.,
1 Fuller

afid Fuller Co. v. McHenry, 83 Wis. 573; Lord v. Parker,3 Ill. 127;
Artinan v. Ferguson, 73 Mich. 146.
30 C.J. 681.
'30 C. J. 671.
'Osborne v. Cooper, 113 Ala. 4o5; McDougall v. McDougall, 135 Cal. 316;
Muller v. Witte, 78 Cal. 495; North v. North, 166 Ill. 179; Ransom v. Ransom,
30 Mich. 328; Bruckly v. Bruckly, 68 Wis. 563.
In re Davidson, 233 Fed. 462.
Jones v. Jones, 99 Miss. 6oo.
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Formerly, where a business was carried on by'a husband and wife,
the presumption was, the business was owned by the husband and a
co-partnership did not exist. But where a husband knowingly holds
himself out as a partner with a wife, he is estopped to deny the existence of a partnership.
Section 6.oI5 Wisconsin Statutes holds "women shall have the same
rights and privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage,
freedom of contract .

.

.

. and in all other respects.

The various

courts, executive, and administrative officers shall construe the statutes
where masculine gender is used, to include feminine, unless such construction will deny to females the special protection and privileges
which they.now enjoy for the general welfare."
This section seems to be a blanket provision whereby a married
woman may contract as a feme sole. This construction permits a
married woman to contract with whom she may choose. Thus a married woman in Wisconsin, under this section, has the right to contract
with her husband as a co-partner in a business.
PATRICIA RYAN

Practice: Judgments: Power of Trial Court to Set Aside After
Expiration of Term.
In Fishbeck v. Mielenz1 it is held that a valid judgment cannot be
set aside after the term at which it is entered except under the provisions of Section 269.46 Statutes. After the end of the term and
within the expiration of one year after the moving party had notice
of the judgment, the circuit court may correct mistakes in the entry
thereof, conforming it to the judgment pronounced, but it cannot
modify or amend the judgment. (Ibid.)
The very recent case Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Rellstab2 decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States throws an interesting light
on the power of the District Court to set aside a judgment on the
ground of perjured testimony after expiration of the term. In December, 1921, one Ginsberg recovered judgment against the petitioner
in this case for injuries to himself and a minor son and for the death
of another son, caused by a collision at a crossing, between the plaintiff's truck and one of the petitioner's trains. The trial and the giving
of judgment took place in the District Court. Later, on the evidence
of two important witnesses, husband and wife, the judgment was set
aside because said witnesses had committed perjury. A new trial was
had and judgment was rendered for the defendant, the present petitioner. The judgment was entered on June 21, 1923. Plaintiff appealed but the Circuit Court of Appeals3 affirmed the judgment on
March 21, 1924. The witnesses who had testified for the plaintiff at
the first trial testified for the defendant at the second, and after the
term of the District Court in which the foregoing steps had been taken
had expired, without being extended in any form, the husband, under
affidavit, stated that the testimony given by him at both trials was
false and that in fact he knew nothing of the matter. With this disclosure, the trial judge, the Honorable John Rellstab, was applied to,
1162 Wis. 12, 154 N.W. 7oi.
'72

L. ed. 228.

1296 Fed. 439.

